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DRUG TESTING THOSE CRAZY CHESS CLUB KIDS: THE 
SUPREME COURT TURNS AWAY FROM THE ONE CLEAR PATH 
IN THE MAZE OF “SPECIAL NEEDS” JURISPRUDENCE IN 
BOARD OF EDUCATION v. EARLS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Extracurricular activities serve important functions in contemporary high 
schools, as they serve to establish positive social supports and networks, to 
teach specific competencies and prosocial values, and to keep children busy so 
they do not have as many opportunities to engage in risky activities.1  As a 
result of these effects, or because lower risk students tend to engage in these 
activities in the first place, students involved in extracurricular activities are 
less likely to use drugs, tend to like school, get good grades, and go to college 
more often than those that do not participate in extracurricular activities.2  
Thus, the Supreme Court’s recent decision of Board of Education v. Earls, 
which states that high school students engaging in extracurricular activities 
may be subjected to mandatory drug tests by high schools,3 is perplexing.  
Lindsay Earls, like many good students, had not been in trouble for drugs 
previously, in fact, Earls was a member of the marching band, the show choir, 
the Academic Team, and National Honor Society.4  However, because of the 
Supreme Court’s concern regarding U.S. high schools and the use of the 
“special needs” doctrine, good students like Earls can be made to submit to 
drug testing without individualized suspicion, even though these types of 
students are the least likely to be using drugs.5  The decision to allow such 
testing is even more problematic because the Supreme Court ignored its 
already confusing special needs precedent in order to hold in such a way, and 
 
 1. Jacquelynne S. Eccles & Bonnie L. Barber, Student Council, Volunteering, Basketball, 
or Marching Band: What Kind of Extracurricular Involvement Matters?, 14  JOURNAL OF 
ADOLESCENT RESEARCH 10, 11 (1999). 
 2. See id.; Jeanne E. Jenkins, The Influence of Peer Affiliation and Student Activities on 
Adolescent Drug Involvement, 31 (122) ADOLESCENCE 297, 304 (1996); Lee Shilts, The 
Relationship of Early Adolescent Substance Use to Extracurricular Activities, Peer Influence, and 
Personal Attitudes, 26 (103) ADOLESCENCE 613, 614-15 (1991). 
 3. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottowatomie County v. Earls, 122 S.Ct. 
2559 (2002). 
 4. Id. at 2563. 
 5. See Eccles & Barber, supra note 1, at 15-25. 
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the logic used in Earls inevitably leads to the allowance of mandatory drug 
tests for all high school students. 
This note will focus on the special needs doctrine and how it has been, is, 
and could be applied to high school student drug testing.  Section II will focus 
on the origins of the special needs doctrine, including some discussion of non-
school based applications.  Section III will then discuss Earls, keeping an eye 
towards the applicable precedent.  Section IV will discuss the state of student 
drug testing after Earls and some surrounding legal areas open to debate, while 
Section V will be the conclusion. 
II.  HISTORY OF SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment states that “people [are] to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”6  Thus, only reasonable searches are allowed under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment extends the application of the 
Fourth Amendment to state and local governments.7  So, all Fourth 
Amendment inquiries must first decide whether the government actor is indeed 
initiating a “search,” and then decide whether this “search” is “reasonable.”8  
The Fourth Amendment only protects against “searches” if the “searched” 
individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy.9  Typically, “reasonable 
searches” are accompanied by probable cause or a warrant and individualized 
suspicion, and limited to criminal investigations.10 
A. T.L.O. and the Inception of the Special Needs Doctrine 
A concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O. started using the term “special 
needs” to describe a growing body of exceptions to the requirement of a 
warrant or probable cause.11  The case involved two 14-year-old girls 
 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 7. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995). 
 8. Id. 
 9. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985). 
 10. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottonatomie County v. Earls, 122 S.Ct. 
2559, 2564 (2002); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997); Skinner v Ry. Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
 11. Matthew A. Pring, The Death of a Doctrine: The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and 
Random Suspicionless Urine Drug Tests Eroding the “Special Needs Doctrine,” 79 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 457, 463 (2002).  The term “special needs” grew out of Justice Brennan’s opinion that 
concurred in part and dissented in part, in which he said, “[S]ome special governmental interest 
beyond the need merely to apprehend lawbreakers is necessary to justify the categorical exception 
to the warrant requirement,” and “special governmental needs sufficient to override the warrant 
requirement flow from ‘exigency.’” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 356 (emphasis original).  This 
phraseology was simply shortened to the “special needs” exception in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868, 874 (1987). 
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suspected by a teacher of smoking, one of whom was T.L.O.12  The two girls 
were sent down to a principal’s office, and the principal demanded to view the 
contents of T.L.O.’s purse.13  Upon a cursory examination, he found cigarettes 
and cigarette rolling papers which the principal knew were connected to 
marijuana use.14  The principal thus searched her whole purse, and found 
marijuana and related materials.15  T.L.O. contended that the search of her 
purse violated the Fourth Amendment, and while the trial court agreed that 
although the Fourth Amendment applied to her situation, the search was 
reasonable.16  The appellate court vacated this judgment, but the New Jersey 
Supreme Court upheld the idea that certain “reasonable” circumstances allow 
for warrantless searches.17  Regardless, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
believed that the circumstances were not “reasonable” in this case, and so held 
the search of T.L.O.’s purse violated the Fourth Amendment.18 
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that while the Fourth Amendment should 
protect high school students, the school needed some degree of autonomous 
discretion in searching students in order to maintain discipline.19  Thus, the 
Court sought to strike a balance between these two concerns, and dismissed 
any potential requirement of the school to obtain either a warrant or probable 
cause.20  The Court decided that the test for the legality of a search should be a 
“reasonableness” standard, based on “whether the action was justified at its 
inception,” and “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place.”21  In applying this standard, the 
Court held that the principal’s search was valid, as he initially had a reasonable 
basis to search for cigarettes because of the report from the teacher, and a 
reasonable basis to further search the purse when he discovered the rolling 
papers.22  However, Justice Brennan thought the Court sacrificed too much 
individual freedom when crafting this test, especially because of the standard’s 
amorphous characteristics.23 
 
 12. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 329. 
 17. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 330-31. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 337-39. 
 20. Id. at 340-41. 
 21. Id. at 341. 
 22. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343-45. 
 23. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Brennan did 
not believe that the “reasonableness” standard to be developed enough for use, especially since he 
believed the test to be unnecessary.  Id. at 354.  Justice Brennan stated, “The Warrant Clause is 
something more than an exhortation to this Court to maximize social welfare as we see fit,” so a 
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The Court in T.L.O. told schools that searching students without a warrant 
or probable cause did not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment.  
However, “reasonableness” under the circumstances was required, and 
individualized suspicion had not yet been deemed unnecessary.  The Court did 
not rule on the individualized suspicion requirement to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, as it was not necessary in T.L.O.24 
B. Vernonia and the Elimination of Individualized Suspicion in Schools 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton further analyzed the special needs 
doctrine in the context of high schools.25  However, because the Court decided 
the case based on a specific fact scenario, 26 the circumstances of this decision 
must be analyzed.  The schools in the Vernonia district had recently been 
victim to a large increase of drug use and insubordination regarding this new 
drug use.27  The District Court found that student athletes were the leaders of 
this new “drug culture.”28  Vernonia brought specific evidence and expert 
testimony regarding the danger that drug use posed to student athletes.29  The 
school district had employed other strategies to combat the new drug 
program.30  The final plan of action would consist of an adult monitor that 
would accompany the student during a urine sample, which would be sent to 
an outside party that would not know the identity of the student.31  This outside 
party would reveal only information regarding the relevant drugs.32  Thus, only 
a class of students engaging in a dangerous activity and known to be leaders of 
a current drug use and behavioral problem were subject to a drug test, which 
would be taken in a discreet and protective manner.33 
The Court’s analysis noted that the action by Vernonia constituted a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.34  However, the Court reiterated its 
 
balancing test is inappropriate.  Id. at 356.  Further, he believed no precedent existed for such a 
“balancing test” of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Id. at 358. 
 24. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342, n. 8 (The Court noted that certain situations had allowed for the 
government to ignore the individualized suspicion requirement, but only when there were “‘other 
safeguards’ available ‘to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not 
subject to the discretion of the officer in the field.’” (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
654-55 (1979)). 
 25. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S 646 (1995). 
 26. Id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 27. Id. at 648-49. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 649. 
 31. Id. at 650. 
 32. Id. at 650-51. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. at 652. 
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position from T.L.O., that a warrant or probable cause is not necessary for a 
search to be legal, if it is based on reasonableness and “special needs, beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause 
requirement impracticable.”35  The Court also noted that individualized 
suspicion had not been needed in other “special needs” contexts such as 
railroad personnel, federal customs officers, and border patrol officers.36  
While noting this, the majority did not attempt to explain why the 
individualized suspicion requirement should be eliminated in the public school 
context.37  However, the Court fashioned a three part test to determine the 
Constitutionality of Vernonia’s searches which included: 1) the nature of the 
privacy interest upon which the search intrudes, 2) the character of the 
intrusion, and 3) the immediacy of the governmental concern giving cause for 
the search.38 
In applying this three-part test, the Court looked to the nature of the 
privacy interest that the search intrudes upon.39  The Court, though nominally 
rejecting the notion that school teachers and administrators have full parental 
power over students, disregarded the general characterization of the student-
 
 35. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 653. 
 36. See id. at 653-54 (For railroad personnel, see Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 
489 U.S. 602 (1989), for customs officers, see Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 
(1989), and for border patrol officers, see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).  
Skinner and Von Raab were companion cases that served to eliminate the individualized 
suspicion requirement from “special needs” situations.  The Court in Skinner found that in the 
context of drug testing railroad workers, “[I]t would be unrealistic, and inimical to the 
Government’s goal of ensuring safety in rail transportation, to require a showing of individualized 
suspicion in these circumstances.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631.  Thus, the Court places the wagon 
before the horse by stating because we have already decided that the government’s goal is 
important and that individualized suspicion requirements would make this goal harder to achieve, 
the individual suspicion requirement is not needed.  No discussion is given regarding the 
importance of individualized suspicion in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Id.  In Von Raab, 
the Court uses a similar argument, claiming that the government’s interest in fighting the war on 
drugs is more valued than the Fourth Amendment rights of the customs workers.  See Von Raab, 
489 U.S. at 672-75.  Martinez-Fuerte, though not technically a “special needs” case, as it was 
decided in 1976, held that the governmental interest of preventing illegal aliens from crossing 
into the U.S. warranted some abridgment of Fourth Amendment rights.  Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. at 554-59.  Thus, up to this point in “special needs” jurisprudence, governmental needs win 
the utilitarian balancing contest with a person seeking to government to obtain individualized 
suspicion before a search. 
 37. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 653-54.  Justice O’Conner makes a powerful argument 
in support of retaining the individualized suspicion requirement in her dissent.  She claims that it 
is not for judges to decide Fourth Amendment cases according to public policy concerns and that 
the Court ignores the fact that suspicionless searches have generally been considered per se 
unreasonable.  Id. at 667-68 (O’Conner, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. at 654, 658, 660. 
 39. Id. at 654. 
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school relationship from T.L.O. and instead emphasized the “custodial and 
tutelary” nature of the supervision that schools exercise over students.40  This 
emphasis included noting that students are subjected to physicals “for their 
own good and that of their classmates.”41  Thus, students have a limited 
expectation of privacy in schools.42  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, noted 
that student athletes have even a lesser expectation of privacy than non-
athletes, as they require public showering, dressing and undressing, placing 
themselves in the public light by voluntarily “go[ing] out for the team,” and 
agreeing to a stricter set of rules of conduct requiring grades and dress.43  The 
Court thus concluded that student-athletes are akin to a “closely regulated 
industry” and should expect to have more intrusions upon their privacy, 
meaning that any expectation of privacy is less reasonable and it becomes 
easier for them to be “searched” under the Fourth Amendment. 44 
The second factor the Court considered was the character of the 
intrusion.45  In urine tests, the degree of intrusion is measured by the manner of 
collection.46  Since the conditions of the Vernonia drug test were similar to 
those typical in a public restroom, the intrusion of privacy is minimal.47  Also, 
the intrusions is minimal since the test demonstrates only a limited type of 
information and the records are released to as few people as possible and not 
turned over to law enforcement agencies.48 
The school district’s drug testing system contained one controversial 
element, namely requiring the disclosure of taking any prescription medication 
in advance.49  However, the Court looked to other precedent such as Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, and decided that the mandatory disclosure of 
 
 40. Id. at 655-56. (In T.L.O., the Court noted many freedoms of the students and emphasized 
the school’s lack of parental power over them, while in Vernonia, Justice Scalia only mentions 
T.L.O. factors that support this reevaluation of the student-school relationship.  The factors 
supporting the students’ expectation of privacy from T.L.O. left out by the Court include the fact 
that compulsory education laws are not “consonant” with school officials acting as parents over 
the children, that children should not have the same standing as criminals according to the Fourth 
Amendment, that students have a legitimate need to maintain certain personal items for use 
during school and after school, and many students bring personal and protected items such as 
photographs, letters, and diaries to school.  Id.; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-40.). 
 41. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 656. 
 42. Id. at 657. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  The phrase “closely regulated industry” was applied in Skinner, and factored into the 
balancing test of the special needs doctrine by demonstrating a lesser expectation of privacy.  
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989). 
 45. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 658. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 659. 
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current prescription medication is not unreasonable, and holds that this element 
does not make the test too intrusive.50  Thus, “the invasion of privacy was not 
significant.”51 
The third prong of the analysis was the nature of the governmental concern 
at issue.  Interestingly enough, the Court rejected the standard of a 
“compelling” interest, instead using an “important enough” standard to justify 
the search.52  At this point Scalia listed the ill effects of drug use by high 
school students including the ease of addiction for younger people, greater 
susceptibility to impairment, and the cascade effects that drug use has on a 
school environment.53  Scalia also noted that student athletes have a particular 
risk of physical injury when drug use is combined with athletic activity.54  The 
fact that the drug-testing program targeted only a class labeled “leaders of the 
drug culture” and “role model[s]” had particular import for the Court, as the 
drug test then narrowly targeted individuals largely responsible for the 
problem.55  Thus, the contextual situation of the student athletes as a primary 
cause for the drug problem led the Court to find that the nature of the 
governmental interest is important enough to warrant a search.56 
Since the Court determined that student athletes have a decreased 
expectation of privacy, the search employed by the school was relatively 
unobtrusive, and the need severe, the Court held that Vernonia’s drug testing 
program as reasonable and Constitutional.57  However, the Court did so based 
on a fact specific inquiry, as the Court stated, “[w]e caution against the 
assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional 
muster in other contexts.”58  The main reason the Court allowed the drug 
testing was because of the newly-defined role of the student-school 
 
 50. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 659-60.  Skinner stated that disclosure of medical 
records was not a “significant invasion of privacy.”  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626, n. 7.  However, the 
holding in Von Raab had deemed important the notion that such disclosure of medical records 
would only be required for those testing positive in the test. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672-73, n. 2.  
Thus, the Court does not require drug-testing to be accomplished in the least invasive means. 
 51. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 659-60. 
 52. Id. at 661. (emphasis in original). I say “interestingly enough” because the Court had just 
relied on Skinner and Von Raab as precedents, and now rejects the standard used by those 
precedents.  Id. 
 53. Id. at 661-62. 
 54. Id. (Drugs pose an additional threat to student athletes because the impairment of 
judgment, slow reaction time, and a lessening perception of pain have greater acuity of affect 
when engaged in athletic activity.). 
 55. Id. at 662-63. 
 56. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 664-65. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 665. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
566 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:559 
 
relationship, again noting the school’s roles as “guardian and tutor.”59 
Additionally, the Court noted that the school oftentimes acts in loco parentis, 
or in the place of the parent.60  In some situations these roles, under Vernonia, 
give a school district the ability to engage in suspicionless searches under the 
special needs doctrine to student athletes. Once the Court construed the 
relationship between student and school in this manner, students lost a great 
deal of their “reasonable expectations of privacy,” meaning that lesser 
governmental interests can now override students’ Fourth Amendment 
protections under the special needs doctrine.  However, this interpretation still 
had to be qualified by the context of the situation.61 
Justice Ginsburg, in concurring, stated, “I comprehend the Court’s opinion 
as reserving the question whether [a district may] . . . constitutionally . . . 
impose routine drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in 
team sports, but on all students required to attend school,” as “[t]he Court 
constantly observes that the School District’s drug-testing policy applies only 
to students who voluntarily participate in interscholastic athletics.”62  Thus, 
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence echoed the opinion written by Justice Scalia by 
emphasizing the fact-intensive basis upon which the decision was made.  After 
Vernonia, despite Justice O’Conner’s convincing argument to the contrary,63 
school districts no longer needed individualized suspicion to mandate students 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Nathan Roberts & Richard Fossey, Random Drug Testing of Students: Where Will 
the Line be Drawn?, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 191, 196 (2002) (listing the nature of sports and 
documented use of drugs by athletes as factors of the Court’s analysis in Vernonia); Neal H. 
Hutchens, Commentary, Suspicionless Drug Testing: The Tuition for Attending Public School?, 
53 ALA. L. REV. 1265, 1272 (2002) (“While the Court in Vernonia considered a number of issues, 
the decision left unclear the specific weight the Court afforded to each factor. . . . In other 
circumstances, students involved in extracurricular activities, including athletics, may actually 
demonstrate less of a disposition to engage in drug use then the rest of the student population.”). 
 62. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 666, (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (Justice Ginsburg 
notices that the fact that the students were athletes affected the three-prong approach because of 
the reduced expectation of privacy, closer school regulation, and the additional risk of physical 
injury.). 
 63. Id. at 666-86, (O’Conner, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Conner, joined by Justices Stevens 
and Souter, wrote that individualized suspicion requirements protect against governmental 
intrusions by giving the individual some means of preventing the circumstances that lead to the 
search, and that to eliminate this requirement is an affront to liberty.  Id. at 667.  Justice O’Conner 
also argues that such large policy based decisions are not for the judiciary to make, and that large, 
suspicionless searches are typically per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless 
there are unique circumstances that would render suspicion-based testing ineffectual.  Id. at 667-
68. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] DRUG TESTING THOSE CRAZY CHESS CLUB KIDS 567 
 
to submit to Fourth Amendment searches if the context of the search was 
strong enough to mandate a special need.64 
C. The “Special Needs” Doctrine Applied to other Contexts 
“Special needs” have been demonstrated in non-school circumstances.65  
As the application of the doctrine turns on the context, a brief survey of 
important special needs cases in other contexts will be informative.  In a case 
in which a public employee’s office was searched, O’Conner v. Ortega, the 
Court upheld the search under the special needs doctrine, and noted that such 
searches may be undertaken as long as there are some “reasonable grounds” 
that the search will discover misconduct.66  Another case, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
held that special needs are present when the police search the home of a 
probationer.67  The Court compared a probationer and a probation officer to a 
child and a parent, and noted that the probation officer is charged with 
protecting the public interest.68 
The Court’s special needs jurisprudence turned an important corner in the 
context of the companion cases of Skinner and Treasury Employees v. Von 
Raab, which dealt with railroad workers and customs officers, respectively.69  
These cases supplied the Court with contexts suitable to eliminate an 
individualized suspicion requirement within the special needs doctrine. In 
Skinner, the Court dealt with a rule that mandated drug testing to railroad 
 
 64. Id. at 664-65. 
 65. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Treasury Employees v. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).  In the 
first Supreme Court case involving special needs after T.L.O., O’Conner v. Ortega, a plurality 
opinion held that the legitimate expectation of privacy by a public employee is outweighed by the 
public employer’s interest of running the workplace. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-
24 (1987) (plurality opinion). The employee on this particular case was barred from his office 
because of sexual harassment allegations filed against him.  His office was searched, and the 
search yielded such items as a Valentine’s Day card, a photograph, and a book of poetry.  He had 
been the only person to use that office for 17 years.  Id. at 712-13, 718.  In holding that a special 
need existed, the Court stated that the government’s interest was strong, as public employees 
perform many services on which the public depends, and it would be too burdensome for 
employers to acquire a warrant before searching the office of the employee.  Id. at 722-23.  The 
Court stated, “public employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility, and the 
consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to both the agency and the public interest can 
be severe.”  Id. at 724. 
 66. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 726. 
 67. Griffin, 483 U.S. at  880 (only one dissenting judge). 
 68. Id. at 876-77 (In “such a setting, we think it reasonable to dispense with the warrant 
requirement,” and allow for the special needs exception to control.). It also seemed important to 
the Court that probationers are within “criminal sanctions” and should expect less privacy.  Id. at 
873-74. 
 69. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656. 
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workers involved in certain railroad accidents, or allowed the employer to 
perform a drug test if the employee is suspected of on-the-job drug use.70  No 
warrant or individualized suspicion other than a “reasonable basis” was 
required under the rule. 71  However, the Court applied a utilitarian balancing 
test and determined that the governmental needs of deterring and detecting 
drug use within the railroad industry outweighed the individual expectation of 
privacy of the employees against a urine test.72  The fact that a drug problem 
existed made this outcome easier to arrive at than it would have been.73 
However, there was no such drug problem within the fact scenario in Von 
Raab.  In that case, the United States Customs Service enacted a plan to 
conduct drug tests for all those who either applied for or occupied certain 
positions, even though the Commissioner believed that “[c]ustoms is largely 
drug-free” and there had not been a showing that any U.S. customs officers had 
been using drugs.74  However, the Court found a special needs exception to 
exist here and allowed the test, due to the strong governmental interest of 
monitoring those people in positions that interdict illegal drugs.75 As “drug 
abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting society today,” the 
Court believed that the government’s interest in detecting drug use was 
compelling, and more important than the worker’s expectation of privacy.76  
Thus, the utilitarian approach of the “special needs” exception to the warrant 
requirement and individualized suspicion now extended to allow governmental 
interests to look for and prevent problems that had not yet occurred, because 
the potential harm could be great.77 
Justice Marshall declared that the Court should not use utilitarian 
balancing acts to justify suspicionless drug testing in his dissent in Skinner.78  
He also argued that the Court ignored the fact that the Fourth Amendment was 
enacted in order to prevent such utilitarian balancing.79  He stated that times of 
crises are the times when the Fourth Amendment protections are most needed 
 
 70. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609-11. 
 71. Id. at 613. 
 72. Id. at 634. 
 73. Id. at 608 (as a result of drug use, 34 fatalities, 66 injuries, and $28 million of property 
damage occurred). 
 74. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660. 
 75. Id. at 679. 
 76. Id. at 674-75.  The Court compares the situation of detecting U.S. customs officers to 
searching for explosives on planes, border checkpoints searches, and housing code inspections, 
all of which do not require a warrant.  Id. at 674-75, n. 3. 
 77. See id.; see also Kimberly Menashe Glassman, Comment, Shedding Their Rights: The 
Fourth Amendment and Suspicionless Drug Testing of Public School Students Participating in 
Extracurricular Activities, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 951, 961-62 (2002). 
 78. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 635-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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and too often ignored, and the war on drugs is no exception.80  Justice Marshall 
found it relevant that all five special needs cases up to that point have found a 
strong governmental interest overriding an individual’s or class of individuals’ 
privacy interest and “ignoring the literal requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.”81  Also of interest, he stated that a “majority of this Court, swept 
away by society’s obsession with stopping the scourge of illegal drugs, today 
succumbs to the popular pressures . . . [to] bend time-honored and textually 
based principles of the Fourth Amendment . . . designed to ensure that the 
Government has a strong and individualized justification when it seeks to 
invade an individual’s privacy.”82 
After Vernonia, the special needs doctrine developed in a different way, as 
the Court began to reject the application of the special needs exception.  In 
Chandler v. Miller, the Court for the first time rejected applying the special 
needs exception and held a search to violate the Fourth Amendment.83  Writing 
for an 8-1 majority, Justice Ginsburg found no special need regarding 
Georgia’s plan to administer drug tests to political candidates running for high 
offices.84  The Court emphasized that in order to overcome an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment right without individualized suspicion, the government’s 
interest must be “substantial—important enough to override the individual’s 
acknowledged privacy interest.”85  In an attempt to differentiate between the 
current case and Von Raab, which was similar in that there was no drug 
problem, the Court noted that difference between the two cases was because of 
the unique context present in Von Raab.86  In Chandler, safety was not at issue, 
and in Von Raab typical law enforcement techniques would have been less 
effective at discovering a drug problem.87  Chief Justice Rehnquist, the only 
 
 80. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall points out that Fourth Amendment rights 
were abridged during the World War II relocation- camp cases, the Red Scare McCarthyism 
subversion cases, and others.). 
 81. Id. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 82. Id. at 654-55  (Marshall, J., dissenting)  (Justice Marshall quotes Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes in support of his position: “[G]reat cases are called great, not by reason of their real 
importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate 
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts judgment . . . [which] before 
which even well settled principles of law will bend.”  (quoting from Northern Securities Co. v. 
U.S. 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (J. Holmes, dissenting)).). 
 83. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
 84. Id. at 309. 
 85. Id. at 318.  Georgia had no problem with drug use among high-ranking politicians, and 
the Court was persuaded by the fact that normal law enforcement techniques should be adequate 
to discover drug use among prominent individuals.  Id. at 318-20. 
 86. Id. at 321 (The Court stated, “Hardly a decision opening broad vistas for suspicionless 
searches, Von Raab must be read in its unique context.”). 
 87. See id. at 321-22. 
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dissenting Justice, did not persuade the Court to support his version of what 
constitutes a special need.  His test was simply to determine if the government 
had a legitimate purpose other than law enforcement.88 
The Court also rejected the use of the special needs exception in the 
context of traffic stops in City of Indianapolis v. Edmund.89  The City’s search 
involved highway checkpoints at which the motorist would be stopped and 
sniffed for drugs by a narcotics detection dog.90  The Court again noted that the 
government must have a substantial or important need to overcome Fourth 
Amendment rights in this matter, as the context of the situation did not merit so 
drastic a measure.91  The Court stated that Fourth Amendment rights are 
important, even in the face of an important social problem: “[t]here is no doubt 
that traffic in illegal narcotics creates social harms of the first magnitude . . . 
[b]ut the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions 
concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue their 
purpose.”92  Thus, even if the governmental need is substantial, the method of 
the search cannot abridge Fourth Amendment rights in such an expansive 
manner. 
The final case decided by the Supreme Court before Earls regarding the 
special needs exception was Ferguson v. City of Charleston, which also found 
no special need by a 6-3 vote.93  The context in question dealt with hospitals 
checking pregnant and delivering women for cocaine use.94  The Court pointed 
out that this test was more invasive than previous tests,95 and found this to 
violate the pregnant women’s reasonable expectations.96  Also, the Fourth 
 
 88. Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 89. City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. at 32, 48 (2000). 
 90. Id. at 34-36. 
 91. Id. at 42-43.  Traffic stops were allowed in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543 (1976), because of the location of the search, as the context of the U.S.-Mexico border 
warranted a search.  Also, this case is different than Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 
U.S. 444 (1990)(in which sobriety checks were upheld because of the significant danger that 
intoxicated drivers pose to the public, whereas simply transporting narcotics does not pose this 
immediate danger.). 
 92. Edmund, 531 U.S. at 42. 
 93. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).  It should be pointed out that after 
Vernonia, Chief Justice Rehnquist has never voted to deny the application of the special needs 
exception, and that Justices Scalia and Thomas have only done so in Chandler.  Chandler v. 
Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Ferguson v. 
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 94. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70-73 (Hospitals were to “identify/assist pregnant patients 
suspected of drug use.”  If cocaine was found, the woman could be charged with possession or 
even distribution, as the fetus would be receiving the cocaine.). 
 95. Id. at 78. (The test was intrusive because the same test yielded information relevant both 
to cocaine use but also the pregnancy.). 
 96. Id. 
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Amendment acted to disqualify this search because the results were to be used 
in law enforcement purposes, which is barred in all circumstances except in the 
odd case of criminals on probation.97  The Court analyzed the nature of the 
special need claimed by the state via “close review,” and decided that because 
of the law enforcement factor, there was no special need even if the women 
were to get substance abuse treatment after being discovered. 98 
D. An Analysis of the Special Needs Precedent Leading to Earls 
After reviewing the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the special needs 
doctrine, an important conclusion to reach is that the doctrine is fact specific.  
The Court does not routinely focus on the same elements of the balancing test 
between the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against the 
government’s interest in conducting the search. Typically, the Court’s ever-
changing method of applying the special needs test determines the result, as 
when the Court focuses on utilitarian principles a special need tends to be 
found, while when the Court focuses on individual rights the tendency is to the 
opposite.99  T.L.O., Vernonia, Skinner, and Von Raab, all cases that allowed 
special needs, focused on utilitarian principles.  In T.L.O., searches were 
allowed without probable cause not because the children were considered 
lesser citizens, but because of the need for the administration to efficiently run 
the school.100  Although the Vernonia Court did speak of students as lesser 
citizens than those of majority, the citing of large amounts of psychiatric and 
medical journals and the Court’s own broad language betrayed the utilitarian 
basis for the Court’s decision.101  The fact that the Court eliminated any 
individualized suspicion requirement for “searches” also demonstrates that the 
Court focused on utilitarian principles over individual rights.  Similarly, the 
Court in the companion cases of Skinner and Von Raab also focused on the 
utilitarian purposes of fighting the war on drugs and making railroads safe, 
dismissing the individual rights concerns of the workers because their jobs 
fulfill a utilitarian value.102  Additionally, the Chandler Court did not speak 
 
 97. Id. at 79-81, n.15. 
 98. Id. at 81-84.  The Court states that the special needs category is “closely guarded.”  Id. at 
84. 
 99. The one exception to this was Griffin, which allowed the search of a probationer via a 8-
1 decision, which was based on a regulatory special need governing probation, and as such the 
decision was not based on utilitarian or individual rights principles.  Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868, 880 (1987). 
 100. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338-42 (1985). 
 101. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 661-62 (1995). 
 102. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989); Treasury 
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 671-72 (1989) (in Skinner, the railroad workers had a 
lesser expectation of privacy because of the danger inherent in railroad operation, while in Von 
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particularly on any individual rights, and looked primarily on utilitarian 
principles.103  However, no special need was found because of a great lack of 
any utilitarian arguments to support the drug testing of potential candidates for 
office.104  No individual rights argument needed to be made.105 
Since Chandler, the Court emphasized individual rights, giving little 
concern to perhaps important utilitarian concerns.  For example in Edmund, the 
searching of cars to look for narcotics did not qualify as a special need, as this 
search could act to get around the typical rights of a criminal defendant, even 
though the benefits to the public generally could have been substantial.106  
Similarly, the Court struck down searches of certain pregnant women for drug 
use in Ferguson even though law enforcement was not the primary purpose of 
the law and important interest of protecting young children from drug related 
abuse.107 
Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, when the Court placed emphasis on 
utilitarian arguments, a special need was typically found, while no special need 
was found when the focus was on individual rights.  However, other than the 
timing of the cases, there was little that could predict what the Court would 
emphasize with a broad rule.  The Court would not focus on individual rights 
only when law enforcement became involved, even though Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s suggestion would have saved the Court much reasoning.  
Additionally, although the Court focused on utilitarian principles in Chandler, 
the individual rights of the candidates for office prevailed in that case, 
demonstrating that the Court still values all individual rights, and not just those 
involved with the criminal justice system.  Also, the Court did not always 
apply utilitarian principles when the searches in question were directed against 
drug use.  In Von Raab, Vernonia, Edmund, and Ferguson, the cases most 
directly dealing with the disciplining or preventing drug use, the Court 
emphasized utilitarian principles twice and individual rights twice.  Thus, 
throughout special needs jurisprudence before Earls, a fact sensitive inquiry 
was used in which it would not be possible for an observer to predict which 
facts would be valued by the Court via any broadly based distinctions or 
patterns. 
III.  BOARD OF EDUCATION V. EARLS 
 
Raab, the customs officers were said to have a lesser expectation of privacy only because of their 
duty to interdict illegal drugs). 
 103. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 317-20 (1997). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 31, 42-48 (2000). 
 107. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81-85 (2001). 
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A. Factual Background 
Since the Supreme Court has stated many times that the context of the 
search is important in regards to special needs cases,108 an understanding of the 
immediate case is necessary.  In the small rural city of Tecumseh, Oklahoma, 
the School District adopted the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy 
(Policy), which required all high school and junior high students to submit to 
drug tests in order to participate in extracurricular activities.109  However, drug 
tests have only been administered to students engaging in competitive 
activities, including band, choir, athletics, cheerleading, and academic 
teams.110  Drug tests are administered before participating in the activity, and 
may be administered randomly or upon reasonable suspicion.111  The students 
must undergo urinalysis, which is only designed to detect illegal drugs.112  The 
School did not demonstrate any pervasive or increasing drug use among the 
students, however some drug use was evident.113  The two students who 
opposed the test are Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching 
band, the Academic Team, and National Honor Society, and Daniel James, 
who sought to participate in the Academic Team.114 
B. District Court 
1. Holding 
At the trial level, Earls ex rel Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Public 
Sch. Dist., the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma upheld 
the District’s drug testing policy.115  In doing so, the District Court used many 
of the arguments that would later be used by the Supreme Court, and as such 
will be detailed later.116  However, certain aspects of the District Court’s 
analysis are worth exploring.  When reading Vernonia, which the District 
Court took to be as the controlling case,117 it repeatedly emphasized the factors 
 
 108. See supra Section II. 
 109. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2562-63. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 2563. 
 112. Id. (The specific drugs the test can detect include amphetamines, marijuana, cocaine, 
opiates, and barbituates.). 
 113. See id. (some evidence, but no “drug culture” or statistics demonstrating the breadth of 
any drug problem). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Earls ex rel Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Sch. Dist., 115 F.Supp2d 1281, 1296 
(W.D. Okla 2000) rev’d, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 116. See supra Section III(D). 
 117. See Earls ex rel Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Sch. Dist., 115 F.Supp2d 1281 (W.D. 
Okla 2000) rev’d, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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from Vernonia that cast schools as the guardians of the students and did not 
mention factors supporting the argument that students have some legitimate 
expectations of privacy in the school setting.118  Furthermore, although the 
District Court acknowledged that the school district’s plan of drug testing 
students in extracurricular activities did not effectively target students who use 
drugs,119 the court dismissed this concern by stating, “[i]t can scarcely be 
disputed that the drug problem among the student body is effectively addressed 
by making sure that the large number of students participating in competitive, 
extracurricular activities do not use drugs.”120  The court noted that Vernonia 
did not require a match between the tested students and the drug users, and 
noted that Skinner and Von Raab did not require such a match either.121  
Additionally, the district’s policy was reasonable because the court concluded 
that Vernonia should not be read to require an epidemic drug problem before 
taking “peremptory measures,” as this would be at odds with the notion of 
schools as guardians of the students.122 
2. Analysis 
Once the District Court decided that the school districts should act as the 
guardians of the students without any qualifiers, the court’s holding is 
pre-determined.  Although this conclusion will be addressed in greater detail 
below,123 it made it possible for the court to dismiss the “bad fit” between the 
students who are more likely to use drugs and those that would have been 
tested under the plan.  If the students’ rights are not a concern, and the school 
is viewed as a parent or guardian, it becomes easy to search any student, 
regardless of any low probability of drug use.  Additionally, though the court 
states that drug testing so many students will help with a drug problem, the 
court overlooks the fact that the students included within the tests are the least 
likely to use drugs,124 meaning there is a good argument to claim that the 
policy will do little to ameliorate the drug problem in Tecumseh schools.  
Furthermore, the district court relied on Skinner and Von Raab in supporting 
the notion that the test need not target those likely to use drugs is in error, as 
those cases dealt with professionals in “closely regulated industries,” not high 
school students.  From these arguments, the court allowed “peremptory 
measures” and ignored the fact-specific analysis in Vernonia by drug testing 
students engaged in extracurricular activity.  Such “measures” could only be 
 
 118. Id. at 1287-90. 
 119. See id. at 1295. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1295, n 52. 
 122. See Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Sch. Dist., 115 F.Supp2d at 1285, 1288. 
 123. See supra Section III(D). 
 124. See e.g., Eccles & Barber, supra note 1 at 10, 11, 15-25. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] DRUG TESTING THOSE CRAZY CHESS CLUB KIDS 575 
 
conceived of after determining that the school acts as a guardian over the 
students, as that sort of abridgment of Fourth Amendment rights, searches 
without suspicion and instead reason to believe the search for drugs will be 
fruitless anyway, is blatantly unconstitutional in other contexts.  Thus, the 
district court’s immediate characterization of students led to its decision to 
validate the testing. 
C. Circuit Court 
1. Holding 
The Tenth Circuit also used Vernonia as the primary authority for deciding 
the case.125  However, writing for a 2-1 majority, Circuit Judge Anderson and 
the Tenth Circuit read Vernonia and the special needs doctrine differently, and 
reversed the District Court.126  The Tenth Circuit relied on the specific factual 
basis of Vernonia, and noted that the situation in Vernonia was quite different 
than in Earls.127  While the drug problem in Vernonia was an epidemic, at 
Earls’ high school, only two students out of 486 students involved in 
extracurricular activities tested positive for drug use in the 1998-99 school 
year, and both students were athletes.128  Similarly, in the 1999-2000 school 
year, only one student out of 311 students tested positive, and that student was 
an athlete as well.129  From these facts, the court concluded that the interest of 
the school in continuing the drug testing program was “negligible.”130  When 
applying the Vernonia test, the court reasoned that although students engaged 
in extracurricular activities do have a lesser expectation of privacy than other 
students, this expectation is not as low as that of student athletes.131  Further, 
the court noted that students have constitutional rights, even though the school 
assumes some guardianship roles.132  After agreeing with the trial court that the 
character of the invasion is not great,133 the Tenth Circuit analyzed the nature 
and immediacy prong of the Vernonia test.  The court noted that many of the 
facts that led to the consitutionality of the Vernonia search were missing in the 
Earls context, as non-athletes do not have the same safety risks coupled with 
 
 125. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d at 1270. 
 126. Id. at 1279. 
 127. Id. at 1272-73. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (not surprisingly, the total amount of students engaged in extracurricular activities 
dropped remarkably). 
 130. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d at 1275. 
 131. Id. at 1276. 
 132. Id. at 1275. 
 133. Id. at 1276. 
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drug use as do athletes, and there is no evidence of any role-model relationship 
between the students tested in the current case.134 
The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that since students engaging in 
extracurricular activities frequently have less supervision than students during 
normal school hours, that the school has a need to use monitor them in this 
fashion.135  The argument does not work, as students who are not in 
extracurricular activities are less monitored than those still at school, meaning 
that if this argument were allowed to prevail, then all students could be tested 
regardless of any extra involvement.136  As the court did not find that the 
matter was pressing upon the school, and the solution only abridged the rights 
of students without fixing any problem, it invalidated the drug testing policy.137  
The Tenth Circuit concluded that if there is no requirement forcing the school 
to impose a program on an identifiable drug problem that will address a 
sufficient number of students to actually redress its drug problem, school 
districts would be able to effectively drug test all students, which would be 
unconstitutional.138  The court stated an “epidemic” need not be shown, but 
that there must be a problem and a solution that will act to solve that drug 
problem.139 
2. Dissent 
Circuit Judge Ebel, though in agreement with the standard of law adopted 
by the majority, disagreed with the way the facts of the case were applied.140  
Throughout his dissent, he stated that the facts of this case were similar to 
Vernonia, as he believed the problem in Vernonia to not be as bad as the 
majority thought it was.141 Further, Ebel believed that students engaging in 
extracurricular activity have a lesser expectation of privacy, as their activity is 
voluntary and therefore they should anticipate more searches.142  Since he 
considered drugs to be a relatively large problem, he analyzed the nature and 
immediacy of the problem prong differently than did the majority.143  The 
dissent also criticized the majority’s requirement that there must be some sort 
of match between the problem and the solution, by noting that Vernonia never 
 
 134. Id. at 1276-78. 
 135. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Dist., 242 F.3d at 1277. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1278. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d at 1279-87  (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. (Ebel, J., dissenting).  He also believed drugs to be a more important problem than 
did the majority.  Id. at 1280. 
 142. Id. at 1283, 85 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 1286 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
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required a strict scrutiny analysis for special needs cases and that the “least 
intrusive” means were not required in Vernonia.144  Thus, although Ebel insists 
that drug testing all students just by their nature as students would be 
unconstitutional,145 he does not mind drug testing a large sample of students 
repeatedly found not to be using drugs, because of the importance afforded to 
controlling drug use among students. 
3. Analysis 
The Tenth Circuit was right to assert that there should be a relationship 
between the alleged problem and the proposed solution, which in this case 
means that any drug testing program must target those students most likely to 
use drugs or refrain from targeting students that were not using drugs.  
Although the dissent argued that the Tenth Circuit used a strict scrutiny 
approach rejected by the Supreme Court, the majority decided the case 
correctly.  As Vernonia depended heavily on a context and a rationale that 
showed that the drug testing fit the problem, it became reasonable for the 
Tenth Circuit to use the same analysis.  Although neither court applied strict 
scrutiny, both Vernonia and the Tenth Circuit applied some scrutiny, so it 
looks more akin to an intermediate scrutiny standard.  These courts both 
admitted the possibility of drug testing, while making certain that 
constitutional rights were not abridged without applying some real judicial 
review to the drug-testing plan.  The Tenth Circuit additionally was correct in 
reaffirming that students do have constitutional rights within the school setting, 
even though the school takes on some guardianship roles.  As mentioned 
below,146 simply characterizing all students as under the care of the school 
without addressing the students’ legitimate expectation of privacy as described 
in T.L.O. will eventually lead to allowing the drug testing of all students, which 
is something both sides say would be unconstitutional.147 
D. Supreme Court 
1. Holding 
Justice Thomas, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed the Tenth Circuit as 
the Court held the drug testing policy to be within the special needs exception 
 
 144. Id. (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
 145. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d at 1286  (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
 146. See supra Section III(D). 
 147. See e.g. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottowatonie County v. Earls, 122 
S.Ct 2559, 2466 (2002); Id.  at 2573 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Id. at 1286 (Ebel, J., dissenting); 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995). 
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of the Fourth Amendment.148  After stating that the Fourth Amendment 
applies, “reasonableness” is the standard, and that warrants, probable cause, 
and individualized suspicion are not needed if there are “special needs,” the 
Court noted that special needs have been found in public schools before.149  
Justice Thomas claimed that the Court did not “simply authorize all school 
drug testing, but rather conducted a fact-specific balancing of the intrusion on 
the children’s Fourth Amendment rights against the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.”150  In doing so, the Court applies the same test used in 
Vernonia,151 it just does so quite differently. 
In undertaking the Vernonia test, the Court considered the nature of the 
privacy interest allegedly compromised by the Policy.152  The Court considered 
the public school’s responsibility for maintaining discipline, health and safety 
standards, and requiring both vaccinations and physical examinations 
important, emphasizing the notion of students as children while giving no 
attention to factors that would enhance the expectation of privacy interests of 
the students.153  The Court rejected the argument that the Vernonia holding 
should be limited to student athletes, by stating that the distinction was not the 
essential factor, and that any student in extracurricular activities also has a 
decreased expectation of privacy as compared to other students.154  Thus, the 
 
 148. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2564.  It should be pointed out how the current makeup of the Court 
typically view the special needs exception.  Since and including Vernonia, the Chief Justice has 
always found a special need exception in the cases before the Court, while Justices Scalia and 
Thomas have found an exception in every case except Chandler.  Justices O’Connor, Stevens, and 
Souter have never found a special needs exception since Vernonia.  Justice Ginsburg concurred in 
Vernonia that there was a special need exception, but wrote to emphasize the limited nature of the 
holding due to the facts.  Otherwise, he has not found an exception.  Justices Breyer and Kennedy 
have only found special needs for Fourth Amendment searches within a public school context.  It 
would seem then that even though Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent in Earls, that the swing 
votes for special needs cases are Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kennedy.  Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 
2559; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 
U.S. 31, 32 (2000); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist, 515 U.S. at 646. 
 149. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2564-65; see also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 74-77; Edmund, 531 U.S. at 
36; Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 652-53. 
 150. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2565. 
 151. Id.  The three part test includes the nature of the privacy interest compromised, the 
character of the intrusion, and the nature of the government’s interest and how the government is 
meeting those interests.  Id. at 2565-67; see supra text accompanying note 38. 
 152. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2565. 
 153. Id.  This was similar to what the Court did in Vernonia, as it emphasized only those 
factors that tend to show a decreased expectation of privacy, while it ignored the other factors 
from T.L.O. favoring enhanced expectations of privacy.  See supra Section II(B). 
 154. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2565-66. 
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Court considered the first prong satisfied if the student is a child under the care 
of the school, and engages in an activity that is not required by the school.155 
The Court also considered the character of the intrusion, and found the 
character of the urinalysis test dictated by the policy to be relatively 
unobtrusive.156  The Court points out, by citing Skinner, urinalysis is an 
accepted measure even though the “excretory function [is] traditionally 
shielded by great privacy.”157  Also, the information provided by the test is 
kept by the school, can be viewed only by those who need to, and is not used 
for law enforcement purposes.158  Thus, the Court finds the character of the 
intrusion to be of minimal harm. 
The Court also determined that the nature and immediacy of the 
government’s concerns and the efficacy of the search fell in favor of the school 
district.159  First and foremost, the Court stated the drug problem in the nation’s 
high schools is growing, stating that “the nationwide drug epidemic makes the 
war against drugs a pressing concern in every school.”160  Thus, though no 
particular findings aside from what could be isolated incidents were 
demonstrated, the School District’s concerns over drugs merited the 
abridgment of the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.161  The Court denied 
the argument that a pervasive drug problem was a requirement before the 
government’s needs were considered important enough to warrant a drug test 
by quoting Von Raab, which stated “drug abuse is one of the most serious 
problems confronting our society today.”162  Justice Thomas also noted that 
this will deter children from using drugs, and that schools should not have to 
wait before drugs are present before searching for them.163  Next, the Court 
rejected the argument that in Vernonia the fact that athletes were allowed to be 
drug tested because of the additional safety concerns that surround sports, and 
that Vernonia excluded the possibility of drug testing students engaged solely 
in non-athletic extracurricular activities.164  After stating that no individualized 
 
 155. See id. 
 156. Id. at 2566-67. 
 157. Id  at 2566. 
 158. Id.  (This goes along with the precedents in Von Raab and Skinner.) 
 159. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2567. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 2567-69. 
 162. Id. at 2567-68. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2568-69.  This argument is again wrong, as it uses the same line of 
reasoning described in the first part of the Vernonia test.  All factors were crucial in that case, and 
it is not simply a matter of noting a student-school relationship and concluding a special need 
exists.  See supra Section II(B). 
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suspicion is needed,165 the Court found no difficulty in drug-testing those 
students not likely to use drugs, and in fact targeting those least likely to use 
drugs, because of the “public school’s custodial responsibilities.”166  The 
Court’s reasoning allows for a school to issue a drug-testing requirement to 
those least likely to use drugs and still satisfy the nature and immediacy of the 
government’s concern prong of the Vernonia test, based only on the 
nationwide drug problem. 
2. An Analysis of the Holding 
In beginning the analysis, the majority’s failure to recognize the distinction 
between student athletes and other students is without merit under the first 
prong of the Vernonia test.  In rejecting the claim that the Vernonia decision 
depended on the factual context of the students as student athletes, Justice 
Thomas pointed out the language in Vernonia that said, “legitimate privacy 
interests are even less with regard to student athletes.”167  His statement was 
supposed to show that all students have a lesser expectation of privacy at 
school, and that student athletes have an even weaker expectation of privacy 
than the other students, meaning that the fact that Vernonia students were 
athletes was only supplemental to that case’s holding.168  However, that 
argument does not follow, as the phrase “even less” does not necessarily imply 
that the fact that the Vernonia students were athletes was superfluous to the 
Court’s holding, as the threshold of a lessened expectation of privacy may not 
have been reached in regards to other students. 
Vernonia did not speak to this question, as that matter did not come before 
the Court in that case.  After considering the basic relationship between the 
students and the school, the Vernonia Court concluded that “students within 
the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of 
the population generally.”169  However, after adding the additional factors of 
student athletes into the calculus, the Court concluded that student-athletes are 
akin to adults in a “closely regulated industry” and “have reason to expect 
intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy.”170  The Court 
did not say that intrusions into privacy were allowed until the Court considered 
the special status of student athletes.171  Reading Vernonia in such a manner 
makes sense, because if Justice Thomas’ reading were to be correct, any 
 
 165. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2568-69.  This was first decided in Skinner and Von Raab, and first 
applied to schools in Vernonia.  See supra Section II(B)-(C). 
 166. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2569. 
 167. Id. at 2565, n. 3.  (emphasis original). 
 168. See id. 
 169. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 657. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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student would be subject to drug testing since all students are in the student-
school relationship.  However, the Court has not stated this to be the case, and 
in fact has stated that subjecting all students to drug tests “is not entirely 
consonant with compulsory education laws.”172 Further, there would be no 
need to consider the different contexts of athletic involvement, extracurricular 
activity, or on-campus parking, if the determining factor of “reasonableness” is 
the relationship between the student and the school.  As courts do concern 
themselves with these contexts,173 the Earls Court mischaracterized the privacy 
interest prong of Vernonia and disregarded the proper reading of precedent. 
The Court had ample foundation in the precedent for holding that the 
character of the intrusion is acceptable.  After Skinner and Von Raab, 
urinalysis has always been held to be minimally intrusive.174  Also, since the 
results of the drug test are not distributed to any law enforcement agency, they 
do not have the same difficulties as did the searches in Edmund and Ferguson.  
It appears that the majority decided character of the intrusion prong correctly 
according to precedent.175 
The Court’s argument regarding the third prong of the Vernonia suffers 
from the same shortcomings that the first test does.  By ignoring all related 
context and focusing on a national drug problem when allowing drug testing 
for students, the Court logically committed to allowing drug testing for all 
students, which the Court has rejected.176  The Court ignored the context of 
Vernonia, namely a recent drug problem had emerged in the school in 
question, the fact that athletes are at a greater safety risk, and the status of 
athletes as leaders of a “drug culture,” meaning they used more drugs and 
served to spread their use.  Focusing on “constitutionality of the program in the 
context of the public school’s custodial responsibilities”177 at the expense of 
the status of the students must logically lead to the allowance of drug-testing 
 
 172. Id. at 655. 
 173. See Bd. Of Educ. Of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottowatomie County v. Earls, 122 S. 
Ct 2559 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515  U.S. 646 (1995); Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison 
School Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000) (students who drive to school must submit to a 
suspicionless drug test). 
 174. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 660. 
 175. There is some disagreement among the Justices here, but a urinalysis test will frequently 
pass this prong of the test.  The dissent focuses on the fact that the test results were not as 
protected as they should have been.  Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2574-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Also, 
Justice Breyer noted some doubts about urinalysis tests being uninvasive.  Id. at 2570-71 (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
 176. See Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2573 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (“Had the Vernonia Court agreed 
that public school attendance, in and of itself, permitted the State to test each student’s blood or 
urine for drugs, the opinion in Vernonia could have saved many words.”). 
 177. Id. at 2569. 
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all students, which the Court claims it must not do.178  Further, on a practical 
level, any abridgment of the Fourth Amendment should be done so in a matter 
that will best accomplish what it sets out to do.  Students engaged in 
extracurricular activity are least likely to use drugs,179 and so developing a 
policy to test them just because they are involved in such activities seems ill-
conceived and unnecessarily abridges the students’ rights.  Additionally, the 
Court misread Von Raab when it relies on it to allow drug testing among a 
population that reported no problems of drug use.  As noted above, drug tests 
were allowed in Von Raab only because of the safety issues and public 
consequences that could result for customs workers affected by drugs. 180  The 
Court in Chandler noted that the Von Raab context was to be limited, “Von 
Raab must be read in its unique context . . . . Customs workers . . . are 
routinely exposed to the vast network of organized crime that is inextricably 
tied to illegal drug use.”181  Some high school students do use drugs, but are 
not involved in drugs to the extent of hunting down drug traffickers, and it 
would seem that the “unique context” is not present in US high schools.  Thus, 
although the problem of high school drug use is pervasive,182 any drug-testing 
rule that ignores the immediate context of the situation and is applied to those 
least likely to use drugs where no pervasive drug problem has been 
demonstrated, does not follow precedent and goes too far in abridging 
students’ Fourth Amendment rights. 
Furthermore, the Court’s rule will allow for bad policies to continue.  As 
Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, “[e]ven if students might be deterred 
from drug use in order to preserve their extracurricular eligibility, it is at least 
as likely that other students might forgo their extracurricular involvement in 
order to avoid detection of their drug use.”183  Since students who participate in 
extracurricular activities are less than half as likely to use drugs, the school 
may be pushing students away from a factor that will tend to eliminate some 
drug use among students.184  Further, students who are pushed away from 
 
 178. See Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 655; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 
(1985) (mandatory drug testing and compulsory education are not “consonant” with each other). 
 179. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2572 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Eccles & Barber, supra, note 1 at 
15-25. 
 180. See Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-75 (1989) (where preventing 
drug use of US customs officials is akin to searching luggage for explosives at airports). 
 181. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997). 
 182. Earls, 122 S.Ct.. at 2567, n. 5. 
 183. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), see also supra, Section III(C)(1) (note 
the decline of the number of students tested at Earls’ high school.  Although they may just have 
tested fewer students, it is possible the number of eligible students declined as more students 
became “conscientious objectors.”). 
 184. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Tamara A. Dugan, Note, Putting the 
Glee Club to the Test: Reconsidering Mandatory Suspicionless Drug Testing of Students 
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extracurricular activities by such drug testing requirements are then likely to 
have more time and opportunity to use drugs.185  Thus, suspicionless drug 
testing on students involved in extracurricular activities is poorly suited for 
addressing drug use by adolescents, making the intrusion on their rights even 
more needless. 
3. Concurrence 
Justice Breyer concurred with the Court’s judgment, agreeing with the 
Court’s application of Vernonia to Lindsay Earls’ contention, but with a 
different emphasis.186  He characterized the drug problem as quite important 
and pervasive, and cited numerous studies that relay statistics on drug use, 
some economic impact of drug use, that the government’s activity regarding 
the supply side of the drug problem has not been effective.187 He further stated 
 
Participating in Extracurricular Activities, 28 J. LEGIS. 147, 178-79 (2002); see also Eccles & 
Barber, supra note 1 at 1 (The authors conducted a longitudinal study that showed that students 
involved in extracurricular activities are less likely to use drugs than other students, excepting that 
athletes tend to drink more alcohol.  Sixty-nine percent of the students polled were involved in 
some kind of organized activity.  Also, interesting, the questionnaire had the children select and 
archetype drawn from the John Hughes movie, The Breakfast Club, namely the princess, the jock, 
the brain, the basketcase, and the criminal.  “Criminals” had the least amount of extracurricular 
activities, and participated even less in them by their senior year.  They were also the most likely 
to drink alcohol, skip school, use drugs, and the least likely to like school.  In contrast, the 
“Brain” was the most likely to engage in academic clubs and volunteer work, and the least likely 
to drink alcohol, skip school, use drugs, had the best grades, was most likely to attend college, 
and liked school as much as the “princess” and the “jock.”  “Princesses,” who oftentimes were 
involved in the performing arts, were similar, but not as averse to risky behavior, to the “brain.”  
The study also noted that athletes were more likely to go to college than other students, but they 
engaged more often in drinking alcohol.  However, this risky activity was thought not to be 
“necessarily problematic” as the risky behavior takes place within the context of a group of highly 
motivated and otherwise healthy students.); Jenkins, supra note 2 (students with high levels of 
academic performance and extracurricular activity are less likely to use “gateway” and “hard” 
drugs); Shilts, supra note 2, at 614-15 (drug abusers reported little involvement with 
extracurricular activity, while students with high levels of extracurricular involvement used little 
drugs and spent more time with their families). 
 185. See Dugan, supra note 184 at 178-79; Eccles & Barber, supra, note 1 at 11 
(The authors [of studies detailing students’ involvement with extracurricular activities] 
argued that constructive, organized activities would be a better use of the adolescents’ 
time for the following three reasons; (a) idle time is the devil’s playground—doing good 
things with one’s time takes time away from opportunities to get involved in risky 
activities; (b) one can learn good things while engaged in constructive activities—for 
example, specific competencies and prosocial values and attitudes; and (c) involvement in 
organized activity settings increases the possibility of establishing positive social supports 
and networks.). 
 186. See Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2569 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 187. Id. at 2567-70 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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that the schools, as actors with certain parental responsibilities, must find a 
way to deal with the problem.188  Justice Breyer also discussed the policy at 
issue, stating that taking urine samples should not necessarily be considered a 
“negligible” invasion of privacy, but that individualized suspicion is not 
needed in this context.189  Further, he believed that a good aspect of the 
program in question was that it did not subject the entire school to drug testing, 
and that there is still an option for the conscientious objector.190 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 2570-71 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 190. Id. at 2571 (Breyer J., concurring). 
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4. An Analysis of the Concurrence 
Justice Breyer devoted little of his concurrence to constitutional argument, 
but instead used his concurrence to list problems the ills of drug use.  This 
emphasis demonstrates that once the schools are characterized as a type of 
parental figure and drugs are considered to be a large problem, little legal 
argument is needed to jump to a conclusion that a drug-detecting program is 
constitutional.  Although few would deny that the drug problem is bad, many 
would contend that such problems do not warrant the dismissal of 
constitutional protections so easily.191  The constitution was written to stop the 
federal government from acting recklessly along the lines of popular opinion 
when other important rights, such as privacy, are endangered.192  Justice 
Breyer’s consideration of drug testing all students193 shows that the Court’s 
current reading of Vernonia is dangerously close to allowing all students to be 
drug testing based solely on school attendance.  Also, he mischaracterizes the 
importance of extracurricular activities for students when he states that a 
student may opt out of them in order to avoid drug testing.  Forgoing 
extracurricular activities has serious implications for students socially, 
physically, and academically, 194 which may be too great of a penalty for most 
“conscientious” students to pay. This is especially true for students with 
ambitions to go to college, as extracurricular involvement is a key factor in the 
college admissions process.195  So, even if the government maintains the drug 
testing program and only tests those students who submit to it, there is still 
quite a bit of coercion being used on the students. 
 
 191. Linda Oshman, Comment, Public School Lessons: Setting Limits on Suspicionless Drug 
Testing After Vernonia, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1313, 1341-42 (2001) (“[T]he Court also should end its 
reliance on the special needs doctrine and return to individualized suspicion when evaluating 
public school drug testing policies.  The Supreme Court should give more than a passing nod to 
the plain language of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 192. See Justice Brandeis’ words from Olmstead v. US, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928), as was 
quoted by Justice Ginsburg in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997). 
(“[I]t is . . . immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement.  Experience 
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s 
purposes are beneficent.  Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their 
liberty by evil-minded rulers.  The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious 
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.). 
 193. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 194. See Eccles & Barber, supra note 1 at 10-13. 
 195. See Rachel Hartigan Shea & David L. Marcus, Make Yourself a Winner: Insider 
Strategies for Getting Into College, USNEWS.COM, 2002, at 1, at http://www.usnews.com/ 
usnews/edu/college/articles/brief/02cbstrategy.htm (last visited May 19, 2003) (a particular 
dedication to a particular activity is now even recommended); Kaplan, Road to College (2003), at 
http://www.kaptest.com/repository/templates/Lev5InitDroplet.jhtml?ProductId=&_lev5Parent=/w
ww/KapTest/docs/repository/content/College/Admissions/Road_to_College/Preparing (last visit-
ed May 14, 2003). 
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4. Dissent 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Conner, and Souter,196 
contended that the majority ignored the importance of context in regards to 
special needs judgments and that the Court is misreading T.L.O. and 
Vernonia.197  Justice Ginsburg stated that by overlooking the context of the 
particular search and students in question and focusing solely on the school’s 
responsibilities over the children, the majority’s logic applied to all students 
and not just those that are involved in extracurricular activity.198  She wrote, 
“[h]ad the Vernonia Court agreed that public school attendance, in and of 
itself, permitted the State to test each student’s blood or urine for drugs, the 
opinion in Vernonia could have saved many words.”199  The dissent, in order to 
dispute the expectation of privacy prong from Vernonia, argued that 
extracurricular activities are an integral part of the school’s educational 
program and they cannot be said to be truly “voluntary.”200  She further argued 
that the context of athletics is different than that of other extracurricular 
activities, as there is no communal undress or any physical risk, and these 
factors act to create a lesser expectation of privacy for athletes than other 
students involved in extracurricular activity.201  Justice Ginsburg accused the 
Court of failing to recognize this distinction, and noted that under T.L.O. “the 
legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, 
under all the circumstances, of the search.”202  The dissent also maintained that 
a urine sampling is more invasive than the Court believes it is, and noted that 
the information gleaned from the tests was not always aptly protected.203  
Justice Ginsburg attacked the majority’s conclusion on the nature and 
immediacy of the governmental interest prong of the Vernonia test.204  She 
noted that the context between the school in Vernonia and the Earls school 
were different in two regards, as the Vernonia school had a much larger drug 
problem, and that its drug testing program tested the students using drugs.205  
Opposed to Vernonia, the Earls school’s drug testing plan did not target the 
 
 196. Justice O’Conner wrote a short and separate dissent in which she was joined by Justice 
Souter, which reaffirmed her dissenting position from Vernonia.  Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2571 
(O’Conner, J., dissenting). 
 197. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 257273(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 198. See id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Id. at 2573-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 202. Earls, 122 S.Ct.  at 2573 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added in the Earls’ dissent) 
(quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341). 
 203. Id. . at 2574-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 204. Id. at 2575 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 205. Id. at 2575-76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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students who used drugs, and had to deal with a lesser drug problem.206  Thus, 
the Vernonia context had a greater need and a plan that more appropriately 
addressed that need, and so the nature and immediacy prong was satisfied in 
Vernonia, but not in Earls.207  In this manner the dissent attacked the Court’s 
holding on all three levels of the Vernonia balancing test. 
In the second part of the dissent, Justice Ginsburg compared Lindsay 
Earls’ situation to the context of Chandler, and argued that the Court should 
have decided the matter along those lines.208  As in Chandler, where 
mandatory drug tests of political candidates were declared unconstitutional, 
there was no “concrete danger” and no action taken to appropriately advance a 
“special need.”209  She also related the idea described by Justice Brandeis that 
the government acts as a teacher, and that such drug testing measures that 
actually accomplish little are powerful symbols that demonstrate that 
constitutional freedoms and principles have little meaning.210  This is a 
dangerous message to teach to today’s youth and tomorrow’s leaders. 
5. An Analysis of the Dissent 
Justice Ginsburg read Vernonia and the Earls context together correctly.  
Although her attack on the second prong of the Vernonia balancing test (the 
urine test) was a futile one, she is right to come to different conclusions 
regarding the expectation of privacy and the immediacy of the government’s 
need prongs.  Vernonia, as recalled from above, dealt with a situation where a 
rampant drug problem was spreading throughout the school that had its origins 
with student athletes.211  In comparison, the school in Earls had a lesser drug 
problem, and offered a solution that did not serve to help the situation and for 
the most part subjected students to embarrassing tests needlessly.212  
Additionally, the fact scenario in Earls had much in common with Chandler, 
because although there was a small problem, it was not to the degree to require 
broad testing of mostly innocent subjects.  However, though the dissenting 
judges were quick to attack the conclusion of the majority, they did not offer 
another solution.  Given that the judges of the majority consider drugs to be a 
paramount problem worth sacrificing civil rights for,213 an alternative plan may 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2577-78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. Id. at 2578 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 211. See supra Section II(B). 
 212. See supra Section III(A) (note again that a minute portion of those students tested proved 
positive for drug use); supra Section III(C)(1). 
 213. See supra Section III(D), see also Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(Justice Breyer seemed concerned about the drug problem in his concurrence, and in his 
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be needed to convince them to abandon the current direction of their 
jurisprudence. 
IV.  AN ANALYSIS OF EARLS AND THE DRUG TESTING OF STUDENTS 
Though the Court has often stated that “schoolchildren do not shed their 
constitutional rights when they enter the schoolhouse,”214 the Court’s 
misreading of the special needs precedent in Earls almost makes that statement 
untrue in regards to the Fourth Amendment.  If the Court allows drug testing of 
students because of their membership on the chess club, schools can craft any 
drug testing program they want, as long as they find some minimal “volunteer” 
basis for the program.  Thus, students who drive their cars to school or smoke 
on campus can almost certainly be tested, and even possibly students who 
choose their own lockers, dress certain ways, or get a certain number of 
disciplinary referrals.  Such an expansion of drug testing could only occur if 
the Vernonia test was applied out of context. 
Given that the Court applies the special needs doctrine based on contextual 
factors,215 a comparison of the context between Vernonia and Earls should 
determine how the doctrine is applied.  The two cases should have reached 
different results under the proper reading of Vernonia.216  In Vernonia, the 
school had a rapidly increasing drug problem, with a group of students who led 
a “drug culture,” and a test that specifically applied to that same group.217  
Additionally, drug use among student athletes poses more risk than to other 
students, and athletes expect to abide by additional rules, for their own safety 
and for fairness of competition concerns.218  Meanwhile, in Earls the situation 
was quite different, as the drug problem in that case lacked the immediacy of 
the Vernonia school, and the drug testing program did not target those 
responsible for drug use, as only three tests out of 792 came back positive.219  
Also, the students subjected to the Earls drug test did not have the same 
lessened expectation of privacy as athletes, and drug use did not pose any more 
of a risk to these students than any other student.220  Thus, the contexts of the 
 
conclusion mentioned that although he did not know that the program would work, it was worth 
trying.  This suggests that he believed action to be required, and so authorized the drug test.  If 
there was an alternative to combat the drug problem that would be more “reasonable” under the 
constitution, then Justice Breyer and the others may hold differently on this issue.). 
 214. See, e.g. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2564  (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 215. See supra Section II(D). 
 216. See supra Section III. 
 217. See supra Section II(B). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See supra Section III. 
 220. Id. 
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two cases differed significantly except for: 1) the subjects of the drug tests 
were students who had at least minimally “volunteered,” and 2)  there was at 
least some drug use at each school.  Since the majority in Earls still held that 
the drug test was constitutional, it had to have misread or ignored all the other 
factors considered in Vernonia.  Such a reading poses a danger to students’ 
constitutional rights, since the Court’s acceptance of view of that the custodial 
role of the school over the students is paramount means students who do not 
“volunteer” for anything may soon be subjected to mandatory drug tests. 
One reason for the Court’s behavior regarding this issue may be because of 
the current perceptions of drugs and high schools.  Courts consider the “war on 
drugs” to be important, 221 and high schools have been increasingly looked 
upon as places of danger after the wake of the Columbine shootings and 
similar tragedies.  Since the Columbine shootings, courts and school 
administrators have been acting to take away and limit constitutional rights.222  
Although these tragedies were awful, they are the exception rather than the 
rule, as schools remain one of the safest places for children.223  Since schools 
are safer than most give them credit for, it would be a mistake to abridge the 
Fourth Amendment rights of all students because of a few extremely bad, but 
highly publicized, apples.  Although it is not possible to prove that the Court 
decided Earls because of the concerns regarding drugs and high schools, if it 
was true, it would be unfortunate that the Court let misperceptions and fear 
cloud its judgment and sacrifice students’ Fourth Amendment rights as a result.  
Or, to put it as Justice Marshall did in Skinner, the “majority of this Court, 
swept away by society’s obsession with stopping the scourge of illegal drugs, 
today succumbs to the popular pressures . . . [to] bend time-honored and 
textually based principles of the Fourth Amendment . . . designed to ensure 
that the Government has a strong and individualized justification when it seeks 
to invade an individual’s privacy.”224 
 
 221. See e.g., Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 676-75 (1989); see also 
Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L. REV. 839, 842 (2002). 
 222. Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools in a Post-Columbine World: Check Your 
Speech Rights at the Schoolhouse Metal Detector, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 739, 740 (2000) 
(Although this article speaks mostly to First Amendment rights, Fourth Amendment rights can be 
said to have followed a similar course after a comparison between Vernonia and Earls.  Calvert 
stated, “. . .[C]onstitutional rights currently are trampled on a routine basis in the nation’s public 
schools, largely out of a combination of fear, ignorance, and self-preservation on the part of the 
administrators. ). 
 223. Patrick Richard McKinney II, Note, On the School Board’s Hit List: Community 
Involvement in Protecting the First and Fourth Amendment Rights of Public School Students, 52 
HASTINGS L.J. 1323, 1344 (2001). 
 224. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 654-55 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
disssenting). 
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Additionally, the Earls Court missed an opportunity to clarify the special 
needs doctrine.  Earls is unique within special needs jurisprudence in that it is 
the first case that can draw on precedent from a similar context.  No other pair 
of special needs cases have contexts as similar as Earls and Vernonia, since 
both cases involved the same “searchers” and “searchees,” such a similar type 
of test, a similar motivation for testing, and closely related arguments between 
the governmental interest and the individual’s expectation of privacy.  The 
context in Earls mirrors Vernonia in these respects, yet it is different enough 
that it should warrant a different conclusion under the same analysis.225  Such 
cases could help observers ascertain the meaning of the special needs doctrine.  
However, instead of affirming the context-based approach used in Vernonia 
that limited drug testing to student athletes, the Court changed the context by 
redefining the relationship between the student and the school, leading to the 
allowance of drug testing students as a class.  By doing so, the Court has laid 
the framework for a future in which all students may be forced to submit to 
drug tests.  The precedent set by Vernonia’s analysis did not inevitably lead to 
the conclusion that all students are available for drug testing, and it is 
unfortunate in regards to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the Court 
decided to ignore its prior reasoning.  Additionally, had the Court used the 
same type of analysis used by Vernonia, some of the rationale behind special 
needs decisions would have been more apparent, whereas now the doctrine is 
perhaps more muddled than it already was.226 
Furthermore, the Court’s decision leads to bad policy and is not realistic 
concerning the current nature of U.S. high schools.  The Earls decision drug-
tests students least likely to use drugs and may act to discourage students from 
joining extracurricular activities that provide benefits for children.227  Studies 
show that involvement in school-based leadership clubs, spirit activities, and 
academic clubs increase the likelihood of the child being enrolled in college 
full-time at age 21, and that all extracurricular involvement is correlated with 
lesser illegal drug use.228  Students who engage in extracurricular activity 
 
 225. See supra Section IV. 
 226. See Krislen Nalani Chun, Note, Still Wondering After AllTthese Years: Ferguson v. City 
of Charleston and the Supreme Court’s Lack of Guidance Over Drug Testing and the Special 
Needs Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 797, 819 (2002) (this note concludes that the special needs 
doctrine is a malleable one, and able to be bent the way a majority of justices decide that it should 
be bent); Jason E. Yearout, Note, Individualized School Searches and the Fourth Amendment: 
What’s a School District to Do?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 489, 523 (2002) (T.L.O. has been 
decided for 16 years and the factors to be concluded in assessing “reasonableness under all the 
circumstances” is still unknown in special needs jurisprudence.  Meanwhile, different courts 
emphasize different factors.). 
 227. See supra note 184. 
 228. See e.g., Eccles & Barber, supra note 1, at 15-25. 
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associate themselves with more positively influencing peers and create more 
positive activity-based identity formation.229  So not only was the Earls drug 
test a bad fit regarding constitutional concerns, but it may serve to isolate 
students from an influence that supports academic achievement and curbs a 
desire for drug use.  Additionally, school districts who use drug-testing policies 
similar to that in Earls may find that certain students have a harder time getting 
into college.  Although extracurricular activities are in the strict sense 
“voluntary,” there is extreme pressure on contemporary high school students to 
engage in these activities.230  Students wishing to go to college usually need 
some kind of extracurricular involvement,231 and so those students deterred 
from joining clubs because of a desire for drug use or who are “conscientious 
objectors” will find themselves at a disadvantage compared to other students 
for admission into college.  Thus, the price to pay by a “conscientious 
objector” is quite high, meaning that because in the realistic sense 
extracurricular involvement is not “voluntary,” and so the drug-testing schools 
apply a high degree of coercion that is not acceptable considering the 
mandatory nature of education. A policy that serves to discourage involvement 
in extracurricular activity and views such activity as wholly “voluntary” is not 
in congruence with contemporary U.S. high schools. 
Given the problems of a Court that misapplies its precedent, a confusing 
doctrine, and the creation of a bad policy, a new approach is needed.  In certain 
situations, drug testing may be warranted, but there needs to be a better system 
to determine when drug testing is appropriate.  The analysis of the Tenth 
Circuit and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent can provide a starting point, as both 
opinions read the precedent accurately.232  However, the special needs doctrine 
requires further clarification.  Perhaps courts could import an intermediate 
scrutiny standard from First Amendment jurisprudence when applying the 
special needs doctrine.  Strict scrutiny would not work with special needs, 
especially after individualized suspicion was eliminated in Vernonia, and a 
rational basis test would allow for too much abridgment of Fourth Amendment 
rights.  However, an intermediate scrutiny standard that forces some 
reasonable fit between a drug testing policy and a pressing problem to be 
addressed would serve to increase the stability of the doctrine and assure that 
constitutional rights are not being set aside needlessly.  For example, under this 
test, the Earls drug testing policy would fail because the drug problem is not 
pressing and that the test does not reasonably fit to remedy the purported 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. See supra Section III(D)(4). 
 231. See US News and World Report and Kaplan, supra note 195. 
 232. See supra Section III(C), (D)(4-5). 
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problem.  The Tenth Circuit applied a similar standard, and although that court 
did not label the standard any kind of scrutiny, it achieved the same result.233 
School districts may use other approaches besides mandatory drug testing 
as well.  One innovative school in Autauga County, Alabama used a voluntary 
drug testing program instead of a mandatory one.234  Their Independent 
Decision program received the cooperation of 55 local stores and restaurants, 
and provided discounts to students who voluntarily submitted to drug tests and 
tested clean for nicotine, cocaine, amphetamines, opiates, PCP, and 
marijuana.235  The system rewards students who choose to remain drug free.236  
The program has been largely successful, as over half of the students volunteer 
for the program, and questionnaires show that there has been a decrease in 
drug use since the program was implemented.237  This kind of system has the 
advantage of using the carrot instead of the stick, as it accomplishes the same 
goal as that of mandatory drug testing, but the students will not feel punished 
or lose confidence in the value of constitutional rights.  Furthermore, discounts 
at certain businesses may offer a compelling reason for students to remain 
clean and some discounts may provide for more use of safe, public facilities, 
such as a roller skating rink or a movie theater.  The program also has an 
advantage over mandatory drug testing programs such as the one found in 
Earls in that all students can participate in the program and not just those who 
are in extracurricular activities and least likely to use drugs.  School boards 
should consider this sort of truly voluntary program before embarking on a 
mandatory drug testing program, even though the Supreme Court allows 
expansive mandatory programs. 
Although Earls allowed for a high amount of students to be drug tested, 
certain factors may be raised that could avoid mandatory drug tests.  One such 
factor is that students over 18 may be able to avoid testing.  Students of this 
age are no longer children, and as such the school may no longer act in loco 
parentis.  As this factor played a critical role in the Earls decision allowing 
mandatory drug tests, courts may not be able to justify a search according to 
the redefined Vernonia test without the subject of the test being a “child.”  
Another factor that could lead to the avoidance of the drug test involves certain 
high school classes that require extracurricular activity.  Courses such as band, 
 
 233. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d at 1278. 
 234. Office of National Drug Control Policy, What You Need to Know About Drug Testing in 
Schools, (June 27, 2003), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/ 
drug_testing.pdf (last visited May 20, 2003). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. (in regards to eighth graders, nicotine use went down from 35.9 percent to 24.4 
percent, while alcohol use went down from 39.9 to 30 percent, and marijuana use decreased from 
18.5 to 11.8 percent). 
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orchestra, choir, and others often require attendance to functions outside of 
normal school hours in order to pass the class.  Although these classes can be 
avoided to a certain extent, meaning that these courses are in a way 
“voluntary,” credit is given for these classes within a school’s mandatory 
curriculum.  Thus, a court may be persuaded that the school is using mandatory 
drug tests on students who did not “volunteer” for anything, and thus fail the 
Vernonia test.  Undoubtedly, other factors may avoid the holding in Earls, but 
such further analysis is outside the scope of this note. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Earls decision ripped away Fourth Amendment protections needlessly 
from students in the name of the war on drugs by allowing students least likely 
to be drug users to be forced into mandatory drug testing.  In doing so, the 
Court failed to apply almost any level of scrutiny on student drug testing, and 
laid the foundation for the drug-testing of all students by virtue only of high 
school enrollment.238  Although attacking drug use amongst high school 
students is an important societal goal, constitutional rights should not be 
abridged because of inconvenience. 
The Court also further confused the special needs doctrine.  The only clear 
standard in special need jurisprudence was that the context of the search was 
critical in determining the validity of the search.239  However, after the Court’s 
misapplication of the Vernonia test, the contextual aspects to be focused on are 
no longer clear.  Additionally, if the Court misread Vernonia in Earls because 
of a perceived danger regarding U.S. high schools, then it missed a chance to 
act as the rational voice amongst the prevailing forces acting to take away 
rights of students.240 
Although Earls was wrongly decided, other avenues for combating the 
drug problem exist.  Vernonia, read correctly, still allows for mandatory drug 
testing of students in certain situations, and courts should apply an 
intermediate scrutiny standard so that a balance can be struck between 
protecting students from drugs and maintaining constitutional rights.241  School 
districts can also enact truly “voluntary” drug testing programs to discourage 
drug use while teaching children that constitutional rights are important and 
not cast aside out of fear or because of the demands of a popular will acting on 
their shock and confusion rather than their reason.242 
 
 238. See supra Section III(D). 
 239. See supra Section II(D). 
 240. See Calvert, supra note 222, at 740. 
 241. See supra Section IV. 
 242. See Calvert, supra note 222, at 740; see supra Section IV. 
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